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A DEAL IS A DEAL IN THE WEST,
OR IS IT?
MONTANA V. WYOMING AND THE
YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT
SHIRAN ZOHAR

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the United Nations reported that by 2025, freshwater
1
shortages will affect almost half of the world’s population. In fact, the
western United States is already feeling the effects of water shortages
2
on the region’s environment and economy. In 1950, Montana,
Wyoming, and North Dakota attempted to avoid the adverse impact
of water shortages by entering into an interstate compact that
3
governed their shared access to the Yellowstone River. The
Yellowstone River Compact’s (Compact) preamble expressly stated
that its goal is to “remove all causes of present and future controversy
between said States . . . with respect to the waters of the Yellowstone
4
River and its tributaries.”
After almost sixty years of relative quiet among the Compact’s
signatories, the States find themselves litigating the permissibility of
improved irrigation techniques that adversely affect other water
5
6
users. In Montana v. Wyoming, the Supreme Court will address


2012 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. United Nations, Global Challenge, Global Opportunity: Trends in Sustainable
Development 11 (Johannesburg Summit 2002), available at http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/
documents/summit_docs/criticaltrends_1408.pdf.
2. See David S. Brookshire et al., Western Urban Water Demand, 42 NAT. RES. J. 873,
873–75 (2002) (noting increased water demand on already limited supplies and its distributional
consequences in the West); Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species
in the West, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 361, 361–62 (2001) (discussing the inevitable conflict between
increased human demands on water and declining aquatic populations).
3. Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663 (1951).
4. Id. pmbl.
5. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception at 3–4, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S.
May 13, 2010).
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whether the upstream state, Wyoming, violated the Compact by using
more efficient irrigation methods that consume more water and leave
less to flow to users downstream in Montana. The Court agreed to
7
hear the case pursuant to its original jurisdiction. As Chief Justice
John Roberts articulated in a recent interstate water rights case,
“[o]ur original jurisdiction over actions between States is concerned
with disputes so serious that they would be grounds for war if the
States were truly sovereign. A dispute between States over rights to
8
water fits that bill . . . .”
II. FACTS
The Yellowstone River Basin is an approximately 70,100-squaremile watershed encompassing parts of Montana, Wyoming, and North
9
Dakota. The main stream of the Basin rises in Yellowstone National
10
Park and flows north out of Wyoming and into Montana. Each of the
four main tributaries flows through Montana and Wyoming and joins
11
the Yellowstone River in Montana. The waters of these tributaries
12
are used primarily for irrigation.
On December 8, 1950, Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota
entered into the Compact, which provided for an equitable division
and apportionment of the Yellowstone River’s water supply and its
13
tributaries among the States. The key provision of the Compact,
Article V, governs the appropriation and allocation of water among
the States, differentiating between pre- and post-1950 water users and
14
their respective rights under the Compact. Article V(A), which
governs pre-1950 rights and is the operative section for the dispute at
issue, states that pre-1950 users possess appropriative rights to the

6. Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. argued Jan. 10, 2011).
7. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“[T]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity . . . to Controversies between two or more States . . . .”).
8. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 876 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
9. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S.
Jan. 2, 2008). North Dakota is named as a party to the case because it was a signatory to the
Compact, but is not taking part in the dispute. Montana’s Bill of Complaint at 3, Montana v.
Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. Jan. 31, 2007).
10. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 2.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 3 (the States artificially apply water to the soil to assist in the growth of
agricultural crops, especially during arid periods).
13. Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663 (1951).
14. Id. art. V.
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15

beneficial uses of the river water. Article V(B) governs “unused and
appropriated waters” as of January 1, 1950 and provides a quantitative
16
calculation for purposes of allocating water based on post-1950 uses.
At the time the Compact was adopted, the main method of
irrigation involved flooding crop fields. This method resulted in a
majority of the water soaking into the irrigated land or evaporating.
This process left about a third of the appropriated water to flow back
17
into the source rivers, where the water originated. Now, more
efficient methods of irrigation allow ten percent or less of the
appropriated water to flow back into the tributaries and to
18
downstream users. In effect, users in Wyoming divert the same
amount of water they diverted when the Compact originated in 1950,
but now they use more of it, leaving less to flow to downstream users
in Montana.
Montana asserts that the new efficient irrigation techniques
19
adopted by Wyoming violate its pre-1950 rights under the Compact.
Montana filed other complaints against Wyoming contending that its
post-1950 uses also reduce water flow and thus infringe on Montana’s
20
rights under the Compact. The Court did not grant certiorari with
21
respect to the post-1950 claims.
This case began in January 2007 when Montana filed a motion for
22
leave to file a bill of complaint with the Supreme Court. A year later,
the Court granted leave to Montana to file its complaint and
23
simultaneously allowed Wyoming to file a motion to dismiss. In its
motion to dismiss, Wyoming argued that the Compact did not impose
24
consumption limits for pre-1950 water uses as alleged by Montana.
The Court appointed a Special Master—as it often does in original

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5, at 3.
18. Id.
19. Montana’s Bill of Complaint, supra note 9, at ¶ 8.
20. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. Montana’s other three theories of compact breach involve alleged
interference with Montana’s pre-1950 rights through use of new storage reservoirs, irrigation of
new acreage, and reductions of water caused by groundwater pumping in Wyoming. Id.
21. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 497 (2010). A Special Master was assigned by the
Court to resolve post-1950 claims. Id.
22. Montana’s Bill of Complaint, supra note 9.
23. Montana v. Wyoming, 552 U.S. 1175 (2008).
24. Wyoming’s Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 19–20,
Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2007).
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25

jurisdiction cases—to resolve the motion to dismiss. The Special
Master concluded that Wyoming’s motion to dismiss should be
26
denied. He agreed that the Compact “unambiguously protects pre27
1950 appropriative rights” from post-1950 uses, but rejected
Montana’s argument that the Compact prohibits pre-1950
appropriators from conserving water through the adoption of
28
improved irrigation techniques. The Court’s jurisdiction to hear this
29
case derives from the Compact Clause of the Constitution. Under
the Compact Clause, jurisdiction “extends to a suit by one State to
enforce its compact with another State or to declare rights under a
30
compact.” The Court agreed to hear arguments on the sole issue of
whether Wyoming’s improved irrigation techniques violated
31
Montana’s pre-1950 users’ water rights.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court recognizes three methods of allocating water
among the states: (1) a suit in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
32
Court; (2) an act of Congress; and (3) an interstate compact.
Interstate compacts have been the major mechanism for defining
states’ rights to divert and use water that crosses or comprises their
33
borders.
There are currently twenty-three interstate water
34
35
compacts, in contrast to only two congressional allocations and
36
three Supreme Court decrees.
A compact is an interstate agreement that has been approved by
Congress and is both a contract between the States and a federal
37
statute. For the purposes of interpreting such a compact, the text is

25. Montana v. Wyoming, 129 S. Ct. 480 (2008).
26. First Interim Report of the Special Master at 15, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S.
Feb. 10, 2009).
27. Id. at 37.
28. Id. at 86–87.
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
30. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 551, 567 (1983) (citing Virginia v. West Virginia, 206
U.S. 290, 317–19 (1907)).
31. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 497, No. 137 (2010).
32. John B. Draper & Jeffrey J. Wechsler, Gunboats on the Colorado: Interstate Water
Controversies, Past and Present, 55 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, § 18.03 (2009).
33. 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 46.01 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed.
2010).
34. Id. § 46.01.
35. Id. § 47.01(b).
36. Id. § 45.07(a).
37. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
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conclusive if unambiguous. Otherwise, “it is appropriate to look to
39
extrinsic evidence of the negotiation history of the Compact . . . .”
The prior appropriation doctrine referenced in the Compact
dictates that water uses that are “prior in time are also prior in
40
right.” The Supreme Court has explained that, “[t]he cardinal rule of
the doctrine [of prior appropriation] is that priority of appropriation
41
Under the doctrine of prior
gives superiority of right.”
appropriation, a person acquires a right by diverting the water and
putting it to a beneficial use. The lack of beneficial use of all or part of
42
a water right may result in forfeiture of that right. If the entire
amount diverted from the waterway is “beneficially used”—put to
valuable use and not wasted—then that entire amount becomes the
43
measure of the appropriative right.
Historically, the
prior-appropriation
doctrine
protected
downstream appropriators, like Montana, from changes in upstream
44
water uses that resulted in a reduced return flow. It is a “wellestablished” principle that “junior appropriators have vested rights in
the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time of
their respective appropriations” and therefore can complain of
45
changes in water use that “adversely affect[] their rights.” Both
Wyoming and Montana have “no injury” statutes that prohibit
46
appropriators from changing the purpose or place of their water use.
“No injury” statutes protect against formal changes in water rights.
The presence of “no injury” statutes is not controlling in this case
because Montana is not alleging that Wyoming appropriators have
38. See Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 690 (1995) (noting that “unless the compact to
which Congress has consented is somehow unconstitutional, no court may order relief
inconsistent with it express terms”) (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983)).
39. Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5.
40. See SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 299, at 307 (3d ed.
1911) (the date of appropriation determines the appropriator’s priority to use the water, with
the earlier user having the superior right).
41. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 470 (1922).
42. See WIEL, supra note 40, at 504 (3d ed. 1911) (“An excessive diversion of water for any
purpose cannot be regarded as a diversion for a beneficial use.”).
43. See id. at 502 (stating that an appropriator is entitled to the quantity of water actually
diverted and used for a beneficial purpose).
44. Report of the Special Master, supra note 26, at 66.
45. Farmer’s Highline Canal v. Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 631–32 (Colo. 1954) (citations
omitted).
46. WYO. STAT. ANN. §41-3-104; MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402. Report of the Special
Master, supra note 26, at 67 (exceptions to this “no-injury” rule have been introduced where
states concluded that the benefits of permitting a change outweigh the cost to downstream water
users).
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changed any formal water right like the place of use or type of use.
Both Montana and Wyoming follow the prior appropriation
doctrine in allocating both surface water and groundwater, as do most
48
western states. It is unclear under the doctrine of prior
appropriation, however, whether and to what extent an appropriator
can increase its consumption to the detriment of a downstream
49
appropriator. Montana observes that it is “not aware of a single case
in any jurisdiction in which a court allowed a senior appropriator to
increase efficiency and thereby decrease historic return flows to a
50
fully appropriated natural watercourse.” Neither party, however,
51
cited a case to the contrary. No court in any jurisdiction, has
adjudicated a case where—”(1) an agricultural appropriator, (2)
increases his or her consumption of water, (3) on the same irrigated
acreage to which the appropriative right attaches, (4) to the detriment
of downstream appropriators, (5) in the same water system from
52
which the water was originally withdrawn.” Since sprinkler
irrigation, like the kind used by Wyoming, was in its infancy when the
Compact was signed in 1950, there have been no cases decided on
whether an irrigator could limit a downstream user’s water right by
53
adopting higher-efficiency sprinkler irrigation.
There are, however, a few cases in both Montana and Wyoming
that deal with an appropriator’s right to reduce water waste. Under
Wyoming law, “[n]o appropriator can compel any other appropriator
54
to continue the waste of water which benefits the former.” Although
the Supreme Court of Wyoming has only decided cases on the rights
to “seepage or waste water,” it has consistently taken an expansive
view of these rights and held that appropriators have a right to reduce
water waste even to the detriment of downstream users who have

47. See Report of Special Master, supra note 26, at 15 (arguing that Wyoming is increasing
water consumption of the same acreage and for the same use as before).
48. Id. at 5.
49. See Frank J. Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 464, 469
(1960) (“Perhaps no area of the doctrine of prior appropriation is so confused as is the law
pertaining to seepage or return flows.”).
50. Montana’s Letter Brief re Memorandum Opinion on Motion to Dismiss at 8, Montana
v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. July 17, 2009).
51. Report of Special Master, supra note 26, at 66.
52. Id.
53. Wyoming’s Reply to Montana’s Exception at 35, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S.
June 15, 2010).
54. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass’n, 307 P.2d 593, 601 (Wyo. 1957).
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become reliant on the runoff. Historically, Montana law has held that
appropriators cannot change the type of water use if it modifies
56
return flow to the detriment of downstream users. This law is not
dispositive because it refers to a change in water use, which is not
alleged in this case. Wyoming originally used water to irrigate and its
57
use remains unchanged. Montana law is thus inconclusive on the key
issue of whether an appropriator may consume more of the water
initially diverted by switching from flood to sprinkler irrigation
58
systems.
IV. HOLDING
The Special Master concluded that the Compact “unambiguously
protects pre-1950 appropriative rights in Montana from new
diversions and withdrawals in Wyoming subsequent to January 1,
59
1950.” But, the Special Master also found that the Compact does not
60
exclude increased efficiency gains from the scope of pre-1950 rights.
He rationalized that any such requirement would “almost certainly
61
lead to additional regulation of Wyoming’s pre-1950 appropriators.”
And that, the Special Master found, would read an additional
62
requirement into the Compact that is not there.
The Special Master determined that Article V(A), which allocates
post-1950 uses of water, “establishes only the amount of water that
63
can be diverted, not consumed, by pre-1950 uses in Wyoming.” His
reading of the Compact’s definition of “beneficial use” mirrored the
commonly understood meaning of the term in western water law—it
permits any use that actually depletes a waterway to be the basis for

55. See Binning v. Miller, 102 P.2d 54, 60 (Wyo. 1957) (“[T]he lower owner using such
water merely takes his chances that the supply will be kept up; that he has no right thereto, no
matter how long he may have used it.”); Bower, 307 P.2d at 601 (“If the senior appropriator by a
different method of irrigation can so utilize his water that it is all consumed . . . and no waste
water returns by seepage or percolation to the river, no other appropriator can complain.”);
Fuss v. Franks, 610 P.2d 17, 20 (Wyo. 1980) (“[T]he owner of land upon which seepage or waste
water rises has the right to use and reuse—capture and recapture—such waste waters for use
only ‘upon the land for which the water forming the seepage was originally appropriated.’”).
56. See, e.g., Cate v. Hargrave, 680 P.2d 952, 956 (Mont. 1984) (stating that the change in
place of use is permissible only if other users are unharmed).
57. Report of the Special Master, supra note 26, at 55.
58. Id. at 84.
59. Id. at 16.
60. Id. at 86.
61. Id. at 58.
62. Id. at 58–59.
63. Id. at 60.
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an appropriative right. That use must involve depletion, but the
beneficial user is not confined to the depletion itself; the beneficial
use requirement is met even if some of the water later indirectly
65
makes it back into the river system. Even when Wyoming’s initial
diversions resulted in some return flow, the initial diversion for
purposes of irrigation is a beneficial use under the law and merits
protection. He concluded that the reference to depletion in the
Compact refers to a settled principle of western water law that to
acquire a property right to use water, the appropriator must remove
66
that water from the stream.
Ultimately, the Special Master noted that allowing Wyoming to
retain the benefits of its improved efficiency is reasonable because “it
encourages increased conservation” by creating “an incentive . . . to
67
invest in improved irrigation techniques.” The Special Master
concluded that the significance of this decision is “inherently limited,”
because it applies to a very particular set of facts; efficiency gains that
are realized and used on the same lands that were being irrigated as
68
of 1950—not for new lands or new purposes.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Montana’s Arguments
Montana’s arguments rest on the basic proposition that the
Compact is a water allocation agreement under which Montana is
guaranteed enough water to meet its pre-1950 demands, and it is up to
69
Wyoming to deliver that minimum amount of water to Montana.
Montana does not argue that the increased efficiency–irrigation
practices are a violation of the Compact per se, rather it argues that
Wyoming violates the Compact by diminishing the water flow

64. See id. at 61(noting that traditional prior appropriation law requires that appropriators
actually divert water from a stream for consumptive use); BECK & KELLEY, supra note 33, §
12.02(c)(1).
65. See Report of Special Master, supra note 26, at 60 (“So long as the as the water
diverted is put to a valuable use and not wasted (i.e., is ‘beneficially used’), the entire amount
diverted is the measure of the appropriative right.”).
66. Id. at 61. See BECK & KELLEY, supra note 33, § 12.02(c)(1) (stating that a water right is
contingent on diversion from a waterway in many western jurisdictions).
67. Id. at 87.
68. Id.
69. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5, at 11.

DO NOT DELETE

168

3/8/2011 6:25:07 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 6:160

70

necessary to maintain Montana’s pre-1950 claims. This violation in
turn has caused, and will continue to cause, direct and irreparable
71
injury to Montana. Wyoming must ensure its increased consumption
72
does not limit the return flow needed to satisfy its pre-1950 uses.
Because Montana’s pre-1950 rights depend on the return flow,
Wyoming’s increased consumption, resulting from increased water
efficiency techniques, violates Article V of the Compact, which
73
governs water allocation among the signatories.
Montana claims that the Compact dictates that its pre-1950 uses
are protected from increases in Wyoming’s consumption, not just
increases in diversion. Montana relies on the Compact’s use of the
74
term “depleted” in its definition of “beneficial use.” The Compact’s
plain language protects pre-1950 “beneficial uses,” which are defined
75
in terms of depletion of the water supply. The Special Master erred
in interpreting “beneficial use” to require an actual diversion of water,
76
Montana
rather than relying on the definition provided.
distinguishes between “diversion” and “depletion” by equating the
latter to consumption that diminished the “return flow upon which
77
Montanans rely.”
Alternatively, Montana contends that, even if the Compact is
ambiguous and requires interpretation, the drafters’ intent was for the
Compact to create a permanent allocation of water, thereby
precluding increased consumption beyond levels set by any party in
1950. The 1950 Senate Report accompanying the Compact establishes
that “a demand of one State upon another for a supply different from
that now obtaining under present conditions of supply and diversion,
78
is not contemplated, nor would such a demand have legal standing.”
Montana also urges the Court to ignore reference to prior
appropriation in the Compact, because the law of prior appropriation

70. Montana’s Letter Brief, supra note 50, at 12–13.
71. Montana’s Bill of Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 14–15.
72. Montana’s Letter Brief, supra note 50, at 12–13.
73. Montana’s Brief in Response to Wyoming’s Motion to Dismiss Bill of Complaint at 47,
Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. May 1, 2008).
74. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5, at 11.
75. Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663, art. II (H) (“The term
‘Beneficial Use’ is herein defined to be that use by which the water supply of a drainage basin is
depleted when usefully employed by the activities of man.”).
76. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5, at 25–26.
77. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. January 10,
2011).
78. S. REP. No. 883, at 2 (1951).
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as described by the Special Master is inconclusive as it relates to
adoption of efficient irrigation techniques, and therefore the
79
allocation set forth in the Compact should govern. The Special
Master’s allowance of increased consumption on pre-Compact
irrigated lands in Wyoming amounts to a transfer of crop production
from Montana to Wyoming, in effect undoing the negotiated
80
apportionment among the States.
B. Wyoming’s Arguments
Wyoming argues that Article V(A) of the Compact does not
guarantee any specific volume of water to flow downstream to
81
Montana. Rather, Article V(A) incorporates the doctrine of prior
appropriation and the “beneficial use” requirement refers to the types
82
of uses rather than the amount of water used. Therefore, Wyoming
irrigators with pre-1950 rights may increase their water usage by
employing more efficient irrigation methods because the type of
83
use—irrigation—remains beneficial. Wyoming’s reading of the
Compact comports with prior appropriation law, where “depleted”
84
means only what has been withdrawn. This interpretation mirrors
both the Special Master’s findings and the way western states have
85
defined beneficial uses.
Wyoming also points to the Compact’s structure as evidence that
water allocation for pre-1950 users is to be governed by the doctrine
of prior appropriation and not by a permanent allocation. The tiered
approach of allocation in the Compact explicitly differentiates
between the treatment of pre-1950 water rights and the treatment of
water rights that would be created by new diversions and storage
projects in each state after 1950. The post-1950 rights were subject to
the cumulative divertible-flow methodology of Sections (B) and (C)
of Article V, which provide quantitative calculations for determining
86
allocation.

79. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5 at 32–33 (relying on Hinderlider
v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)).
80. Id. at 16.
81. Wyoming’s Reply Brief, supra note 53, at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 22 (Wyoming equates “withdrawal” with “beneficial use.”).
85. Id. at 13.
86. Id. at 11.
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The Compact established that “Montana and Wyoming will
interact as dictated by the various rules of the doctrine of
appropriation” and did not create “any hard and fast amount of water
87
to which [appropriative] rights will be either entitled or limited.”
Wyoming argues that prior appropriation rights are defined in terms
of “depletion” in the Compact in order to prevent States from
88
acquiring rights to non-depletive uses, such as mill use on a river. As
the Solicitor General elaborated during oral arguments, the drafters
chose to use the word “depletion” rather than “diversion” because
89
depletion is a “criterion for beneficial use,” not because depletion
90
equates with consumption. Had the drafters intended that beneficial
use be limited to consumption, they would have expressed their
91
intention in clear and express terms. Other compacts that impose
quantitative limits like that which Montana proposes contain express
92
provisions to that effect.
C. United States’ Argument
The United States has considerable interest in this case because it
administers water projects throughout the Yellowstone River Basin
93
that may be affected by the Court’s construction of the Compact.
Both because of the United States’ role as administrator of water
projects in the Basin and because compacts possess the status of
federal law once approved by Congress, the Court invited the United
94
States to participate. The Solicitor General of the United States
sided with Wyoming and stated that increased efficiency irrigation
techniques by Wyoming do not constitute a violation of the
95
Compact. The Solicitor General’s main argument is that the
Compact is governed by the background principle of prior
appropriation, which is concerned with the amount of water diverted
96
for beneficial use, not the amount of water consumed.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 21 (such a use would divert, but not consume, water).
89. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 50.
90. Id. at 50–51.
91. Wyoming’s Reply Brief, supra note 53, at 22.
92. See, e.g., Republican River Basin Compact art. III, 57 Stat. 86 (1943) (providing for the
allocation of water based as a percentage of an annual computed water supply).
93. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss at
29, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. May 1, 2008).
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VI. DISPOSITION
The Court must determine what the correct meaning of
“beneficial use” is in the Compact. Montana argues that it refers to
97
the net use of water — the amount of water diverted subtracted by
the amount of water returned to the river. Wyoming and the U.S.
argue that it refers to “a calculation of what is taken without
98
reference to what returns.”
The Special Master concluded that, according to the doctrine of
prior appropriation, the Compact does not prohibit Wyoming from
99
increasing its consumption by adopting improved irrigation methods.
100
His interpretation of the doctrine comports with Wyoming law and
does not contradict Montana law’s version of the doctrine, which is
101
itself conflicted. Though this case may be of limited applicability
because the Compact is somewhat unusual in its allocation of water, it
is unlikely that the Court would want to reach a decision that would
discourage more efficient water practices in the increasingly arid
102
West.
During oral arguments, the Court primarily focused on
103
deciphering the meaning of “beneficial use” in the Compact. The
Justices, with the exception of Justice Scalia, appeared wholly
unconvinced that “depletion” is the same as “consumption,” given the
104
history of prior appropriation law. Justice Scalia refused to accept
Wyoming’s argument that depletion is the same as diversion because

97. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5, at 18–19.
98. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 33.
99. Report of Special Master, supra note 26, at 90.
100. See note 55 and accompanying text (Wyoming law permits water users to curb runoff
even when downstream users have become reliant on the runoff.).
101. See e.g., Cate v. Hargrave, 680 P.2d 952, 956 (Mont. 1984) (holding that appropriators
cannot change their place or type of use if it would detrimentally affect downstream users); but
see e.g., Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Mont. 1933) (holding that
an appropriator may collect or recapture runoff “before it leaves his possession, but, after it gets
beyond his control it thus becomes waste and is subject to the appropriation of another”)
(emphasis added).
102. See id. at 37 (Unlike many other interstate water compacts, Article V(A) of the
Yellowstone River Compact does not establish an allocation based on a quantity of water.).
103. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77.
104. Compare id. at 9 (Chief Justice Roberts: “[T]he way water law worked in the West . . .
is you have the right to take out however much you were taking out, and the fact that less comes
back, that’s something different. That doesn’t affect your appropriation.”) with id. at 28 (Justice
Scalia: “[W]hat is guaranteed is not the diversion right that existed pre-1950, but the beneficial
use right, which is the net use of the water—not the total amount diverted.”). Justice Kagan
took no part in deciding this case.
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he did not understand why the drafters would choose to use the term
105
“depletion” rather than “diversion,” if that was what they meant.
The prevailing attitude among the Justices, however, was much more
receptive to Wyoming’s analysis. Wyoming’s analysis neatly comports
with the fundamentals of western water law; it is the straightforward
understanding that water users have a right to take out however much
they were taking out at the time of the appropriation, and the fact
that less returns does not affect the users’ appropriation. Because this
argument falls squarely in line with the Justices’ view of western
water law, Wyoming likely will win this case.
Furthermore,
Montana’s
position
proved
particularly
unpersuasive to the Justices due to the practical constraints it would
impose. During oral arguments, both Justice Breyer and Sotomayor
seemed particularly troubled with the consequences of applying a
consumption metric—i.e. one that calculates the water right based on
how much water was actually consumed, rather than diverted—to
106
appropriative rights. By adopting consumption as the metric, states
would have to monitor and require reporting of any change in crop or
method of irrigation because such a change would cause a difference
107
in return flow. It is unlikely the Compact intended to impose such
requirements, as the Compact itself states that its “provisions are
108
easily administered, and require no elaborate organization.”
Additionally, equating “beneficial use” with the amount of water
consumed would require actual knowledge of how much each
109
individual irrigator returns to the river in Wyoming. Even Wyoming
acknowledged that there is no way of knowing whether each
individual irrigator could measure how much he returned to the
110
River.
Justice Breyer asked the Solicitor General whether there was a
111
“fair way to decide this case?” The Solicitor General responded that
the fairest way to resolve the dispute between Montana and Wyoming
112
is by enforcing what the States signed up for. According to the text
of the Compact, the history of prior appropriation and the current
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 28.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77 at 7, 10–11.
Report of Special Master, supra note 26, at 87–88.
S. REP., supra note 78, at 1.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 43.
Id.

DO NOT DELETE

2011]

3/8/2011 6:25:07 PM

A DEAL IS A DEAL IN THE WEST: OR IS IT? MONTANA V. WYOMING

173

trend of protecting appropriators who limit waste, the Supreme Court
likely will return to the central dogma of western water law—”prior
113
in time, prior in right,” and find that Wyoming is entitled to the
amount of water that it has diverted since 1950, without any regard to
what flows back.

113. WIEL, supra note 40, at 307.

